enforcement attempts and the limits imposed on such action by the same international law.
In some respects the ado about the Act appears to revolve around the pitting of substantive against formal rules of international law. While the US maintains that it is defending property rights of its citizens that had been infringed in violation of an international 'treatment of aliens' standard, Europeans and America's NAFTA trade partners regard the US action as a violation of the international rules of 'jurisdiction to prescribe', which delimit each sovereign's legislative sphere.
It is very likely that the two sides will not enter into a meaningful dialogue, but rather misunderstand each other fundamentally, because their lines of argument will probably fall back on these two completely different levels of discourse. This comment will undertake to avoid this almost pre-ordained misunderstanding and try to address the two competing claims along with their proper counter-arguments. In other words, it will ask whether the protection of private property as an intended goal of the legislation could prove acceptable for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction to prescribe as a matter of international law, and on the other hand, whether the perceived unlawfulness of extraterritorial legislation is indeed as rigorous as is claimed by America's trading partners.
Before entering the debate about the lawfulness of the Helms-Burton Act under international law, a brief summary of the operative provisions of the legislation seems appropriate.
II. The Content of the Helms-Burton Act
The Act is divided into four titles aiming at: 'I. Strengthening international sanctions against the Castro government'; 'II. Assistance to a free and independent Cuba'; 'III. tation safeguard against certain Cuban products'; 6 and the 'Exclusion from the United States of aliens who have confiscated property of United States nationals or who traffic in such property '. 7 This comment, however, will focus on the Act's most prominent feature, its purported protection of property rights of US citizens. Giving US nationals whose properties in Cuba have been expropriated a claim for damages against 'traffickers' in such property enforceable in US courts is the most controversial and at the same time the most 'innovative' part of the legislation. 8 This right to sue, granted in Title III of the Act, serves the stated purpose 9 of deterring foreign investment in Cuba, perceived by the US as a major reason for Cuba's continuing economic survival after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing end of financial support from the former Eastern Bloc.
Protection of property rights of United

A. Title III of the Helms-Burton Act
Sec. 302(a)(l) states that 'any person that [...] traffics in property which was confiscated by the Cuban government on or after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claims to such property for money damages 
1) has confiscated, or has directed or overseen the confiscation of, property a claim to which is owned by a United States national, or converts or has converted fpr personal gain confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United States national; (2) traffics in confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United States national; (3) is a corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a controlling interest of an entity which has been involved in the confiscation of property or trafficking in confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United States national; or (4) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person excludable under paragraph (1). (2), or (3).' This provision has been criticized as 'particularly absurd' by a U.K. member of parliament. Cf. 'Britain May Retaliate For Helms-Burton Act', The Washington Post, May 3,1996, A25. The Clinton administration's initial opposition to the Act resulted in a remarkable compromise: according to Sec. 306, Title III will enter into force only on August 1, 1996 but the President has the authority to suspend this effective date for additional six month periods if he determines that a suspension is 'necessary to the national interests of the United States'. Cf. the Congressional 'Findings' in Sec. 301(5): "The Cuban Government is offering foreign investors the opportunity to purchase an equity interest in. manage, or enter into joint ventures using property and assets some of which were confiscated from United States nationals.' and (11): 'To deter trafficking in wrongfully confiscated property. United States nationals who were the victims of these confiscations should be endowed with a judicial remedy in the courts of the United States that would deny traffickers any profits from economically exploiting Castro's wrongful sei- The thrust of the criticism of America's trading partners and allies is directed against the 'extraterritoriality' of the Act's provisions and in particular of Title III. For instance, the European Union vehemently opposes 'extraterritorial applications of US jurisdiction' and with regard to the Helms-Burton Act formally objected 'as a matter of principle, to those provisions that seek to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction of US federal courts over disputes between the US and foreign companies regarding expropriated property located overseas.'
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The extraterritoriality of the Act, however, is less obvious than in previous transatlantic jurisdictional disputes. These controversies involved, inter alia, attempts to apply a State's public law (jurisdiction to prescribe) extraterritorially or to subject foreign parties to a State's courts (jurisdiction to adjudicate). 19 The two best known instances were, on the one hand, the Pipeline dispute of the early 1980s, where the US sought to make its re-export prohibitions on certain allegedly 'American' tech- In Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, the US has not technically exercised its jurisdiction to prescribe, in the sense that it would have formally prohibited 'trafficking' in Cuban/former US property. The only thing it did was to create a private law liability claim enforceable in US courts. The US may thus claim that it has only 'provided a private remedy' for its nationals to go after persons engaged in an activity that is already prohibited as 'receiving stolen property '. 22 However, in substance the provisions of Title III are an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction to prescribe. The choice of a private law tool (with the threat of treble damages) should be regarded as an alternative to a 'public law' prohibition to invest in Cuba, if not an effective 'disguised' prohibition. It is a commonly acknowledged feature of tort law -and in particular of US tort law -that it can also serve a strong 'public' order purpose. The concept of punitive damages and of individual plaintiffs serving as 'private attorney generals' enforcing the public policy of a State underlines this idea.
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In the context of the Helms-Burton Act, the potential exposure to substantial dollar amounts of damages is clearly a tool to regulate private behaviour, i.e. more the suppression of 'trafficking' and less a means to reallocate the financial burdens of the Cuban expropriations. This primarily deterrent effect and intent of the Actwhich make it more akin to a 'public law' prohibition than a 'private law' tort ruleis made explicit in many ways: Trafficking is seen as a way of contributing to the viability of the Cuban economy contrary to US foreign policy. 24 Very indicative are also the substantive limitations to recovery: Sec. 302(a)(l) enacts only a prospective deterrent against 'trafficking' occurring after a three months period following the entry into effect of Title III. This clearly leaves those US citizens without a remedy whose confiscated property had earlier become the object of 'trafficking'. That fact might cause doubts whether the private recovery goal was really an equally impor- tant purpose for the legislation as the investment deterrence objective. To introduce such an exclusion of retroactivity also underlines the 'public' law and quasi-criminal character of the legislation. If 'receiving stolen property 1 was already forbidden in the particular situation envisaged by the Act, there would have been no need for this limitation. Its inclusion indicates the awareness that, in effect, the legislation enacts a hitherto non-existent prohibition to 'traffic in former US property' to be enforced by quasi-penal sanctions for which both US constitutional law -prohibiting ex post facto laws -and the international human rights rule of nullum crimen sine lege require non-retroactivity.
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On the other hand, the EU's allegation that the US is seeking 'to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction of US federal courts over disputes, between the US and foreign companies regarding expropriated property located overseas' 26 has to be taken cum grano salts as well. The wording of the Act does not indicate that US jurisdiction to adjudicate has been enlarged. On the contrary, the normal procedural requirements to obtain jurisdiction over potential defendants seem to remain applicable.
27 Federal courts will thus still have to gain in personam jurisdiction over 'traffickers' when sued by US nationals.
28 Despite certain 'long-arm' aspects of US procedural law, the exercise of this adjudicative jurisdiction is limited by constitutional considerations based on the International Shoe test 29 and further developed in subsequent court decisions.
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Nevertheless, the legality of the extraterritorial prohibition to 'traffic' in confiscated US property remains to be scrutinized.
IV. The Lawfulness of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act under International Rules of Jurisdiction
The lawfulness of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act under international law largely depends upon the answer to the question of whether a justification for this exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction can be found. 32 Suffice it to say that there appears to be a growing consensus that any assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction requires a sufficiently 'close connection' between the State exercising jurisdiction and the facts or persons affected.
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One of the generally recognized 'links' for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the effects doctrine, also called 'objective territoriality principle', seems to be particularly well suited to justify the recent US legislation. Indeed, the 'Congressional Findings' of the Act broadly paraphrase the well-known formulation of the effects principle in the American Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law holding that '[international law recognizes that a nation has the ability to provide for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.' 34 There are some significant nuances in this reference, however, that one should not fail to note. First, -like in the Restatement -the unspecified reference to prescriptive jurisdiction which does not discuss the highly controversial issue of whether this kind of 'effects jurisdiction' is valid only for certain economic regulations, such as 'antitrust' or 'competition' law, or whether it could be seen acceptable under international law in general. Second, the Act's formulation omits the qualifying limitation of the Restatement's rule which makes the exercise of such jurisdiction subject to a test of 'reasonableness'.
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As far as the first point is concerned, there seems to be a growing consensus, at least in State practice, to use 'effects' as a link to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over anti-competitive behaviour. Nevertheless, even in those circumstances it is not wholly accepted. 36 In areas such as export controls the legality of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law appears even more doubtful. 37 What is particularly troubling is that it seems questionable whether under the Act's own modest standards, unlimited by an express 'reasonableness requirement', 'substantial effect', which is still necessary to confer jurisdiction, can be established. The
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The Case of the 5. conduct sought to be regulated, or rather discouraged, is 'trafficking' in confiscated property -in other words, investing in Cuba. Its potential effect within the US is hard to ascertain. The US legislators may have relied on the concept that the commercial use of the expropriated property by foreigners could diminish the potential for compensation to the former owners. 38 However, the circumstance that 'traffickers' might derive benefits from such property does not affect Cuba's international law obligation to compensate for its original unlawful taking. Thus, it would be difficult to argue that the current foreign investment activities have a harmful effect within the US. Also the 'national security threat' amply invoked by the US legislation 39 appears to be a far-fetched consequence of such activities, if at all. It seems to be a result of the Cuban government's comportment rather than of the foreign investors' commercial contacts. 40 Thus, under a traditional concept of territoriality as well as the 'objective territoriality' principle, an effects-based justification for the exercise of jurisdiction in Title III of the Act is likely to fail. If one looks, however, at more flexible approaches to the problem of regulating economic facts and situations, a different conclusion is at least conceivable. Such an alternative view requires reliance less on formal jurisdictional principles -that could then be applied more geometrico to the situations in question -but rather more on an analysis of the substantive interests involved and in particular on their link to rules of international law. Such an interests balancing approach would certainly fit into the 'American' Restatement rules of reasonableness by taking into account political, human rights, and other concerns.
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It is a matter of scholarly debate whether the 'reasonableness rule' of the Restatement which it portrays as a requirement of international law 42 is indeed part of international law. 43 expression of the international lex lata, it appears to be a useful and sensible limitation of an otherwise potentially over-reaching extraterritorial jurisdiction, and for the sake of argument one should consider the validity of the US claim to jurisdiction in the given circumstances of the Helms-Burton Act under such a broad and flexible jurisdictional concept.
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In addition, one could also contemplate whether the 'close link' requirement between the conduct to be regulated and the State wanting to assert jurisdiction cannot be replaced by a general interest under international law that is regulated 'vicariously* by a single State. An interesting example where this thought seems accepted is the principle of universal jurisdiction in international humanitarian law. Under this principle, the gravity and seriousness of the offense justifies the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over acts committed in a place different from the forum State. 47 In such cases, the interest of the international community in protecting core values of international law serves as a substitute for a State's otherwise lacking jurisdictional link.
It is quite obvious that criminal jurisdiction principles are something genuinely different from the civil liability legislation contained in the Helms-Burton Act, but one should ask -at least hypothetically -whether the rationale for the legislationi.e. the protection of private property rights -might be (or at least could replace) a close enough link to the US, justifying its extraterritorial jurisdiction.
V. The Helms-Burton Act as Decentralized Protection of Private Property Rights?
Apart from the strict technical jurisdictional issues involved, the recent US legislation could be seen as another quite innovative attempt at redressing foreign expropriations. Throughout this century the US has proven a vigilant protector of private property rights, especially of those of US citizens vis-a-vis foreign States. 48 While it has formally rejected European gunboat diplomacy 49 -largely on the ground of Monroe Doctrine resistance against European intervention in American affairs -it has -frequently justified by variations of the same doctrine -put pressure on foreign governments to respect US property interests. Frequently the exercise of US diplomatic protection led to the establishment of bi-or unilateral Claims Commissions adjudicating claims of US citizens against foreign governments. 
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In this light, the Act could be viewed as a final chapter in a rather desperate endeavor to bring down the Castro regime, which, despite all its economic troubles, has so far turned out to be remarkably immune to US economic pressure. The Act attempts to force nationals of other States indirectly to refrain from doing business in Cuba. In this respect it has a similar trait with the traditional blacklisting of foreign firms under the US export control regime. 53 Although the Act is technically limited to 'traffickers' in expropriated property, the legal uncertainty about what kind of property might actually be affected will probably deter many foreign investors from doing business in Cuba at all. 54 Given the legislation's political background, it seems plausible to suspect that the political punishment motive weighed more heavily than the American intent to grant relief to expropriated US citizens.
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VI. Enforcing International Law through Domestic Courts?
Under the Helms-Burton Act the technique of redressing the alleged wrongdoing of 'confiscation' lies in entrusting it to the private parties aggrieved, expropriated US citizens, and depends upon their use of US courts. This is an interesting feature of a current trend to enforce international law through domestic courts.
The US has a long record of inventing legal techniques in order to protect private interests, not only against its own governmental actions, but also against the official acts of foreign authorities. A good example is the dramatic rediscovery of an 'an- 59 and has led American courts to uphold their jurisdiction in civil damage cases brought by the parents of a Paraguayan citizen who died as a result of being tortured in Paraguay by a Paraguayan official 60 and by Argentine citizens against a former Argentine general for acts of torture, murder and arbitrary detention in Argentina.
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While it is certainly legitimate, if not required under international law, to provide for domestic means of redress against acts of domestic organs, it seems more questionable whether the protection against foreign acts can be made subject to the domestic procedures of another State. In these situations, States have traditionally opted for international, as opposed to (extraterritorial) foreign national, supervision, such as the Inter-American or the European Human Rights Courts, etc. The lack of such external methods, as in the case of Cuba (which has not ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights and rejects any form of international control of its internal acts as an intervention into its domestic affairs) 62 might make the quest for alternatives understandable, and such alternatives might even have some moral persuasiveness. However, it does not in itself justify the solutions found.
A. Wrong Right?
The potential legitimacy of action to remedy cases of gross violations of human rights forms part of the current international law debate where the discussion centers on the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention, etc.
63 However, while there seems to be a growing consensus that collective action might even use forceful means to reach humanitarian ends, it is still highly controversial whether the same could be held true for unilateral actions. Against this background, one could at least argue whether 'weaker' forms of unilateral redress, such as judicial remedies offered against individual human rights violators, can be viewed as lawful under international law. It is important, however, to remember that this justification probably only applies to a core of human rights provisions falling within the -albeit difficult to delimit -sphere of jus cogens rights. Based on the assumption that a violation of such rights has an erga omnes effect, i.e. is a violation of obligations vis-a-vis all other States, each of the other States arguably has an individual right to respond.
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Recourse to national courts to adjudicate violations of international law is not totally revolutionary. The traditional acceptance of the exercise of jurisdiction over war criminals and other offenders against the law of nations (e.g. in cases of piracy or slave trade), even in the absence of any territorial or personal link of the prosecuting State to the crimes or perpetrators involved, is a good example in point. Here, the common interest of all States substitutes for the lack of jurisdictional links. Currently, we seem to witness a trend to enlarge this kind of universal jurisdiction. For the acceptance by other States of this kind of extraterritorial jurisdiction it is crucial, however, that the values protected are indeed shared ones. 65 That is exactly the problem with the legislation at hand. The Helms-Burton Act seeks to redress the consequences of allegedly internationally unlawful expropriations. The legal rules governing expropriation and in particular the issue of compensation, however, belong to the most controversial areas of public international law. 66 Significantly, most contemporary international human rights instruments even fail to mention the protection of private property as a human right 67 Certainly, one should not underestimate the US as a last stronghold of protecting proprietary rights as human rights. But the unilateral motive can hardly substitute for international substance.
B. Wrong Defendant?
The second fundamental problem under the Helms-Burton legislation concerns the 'object' of the attempted redress. The Act is not directly addressed precisely towards the internationally unlawful expropriation, but rather against the benefits derived from such takings, the result of 'trafficking'. 68 The Act does not -because it cannot -remedy the uncompensated expropriations, but rather seeks to provide for alternative compensation from those 'aiding and abetting' the unlawful Cuban activity. Even from a purely semantic point of view, it becomes apparent that by the recent legislation, the US attempts to penalize foreign investment behaviour by approximating it to something forbidden under domestic law. The Act expressly equates 'expropriation' with 'theft' 69 and defines the investment activities of foreign nationals involving expropriated property as 'trafficking' 70 , a term usually reserved for particularly wrongful activities, such as dealing with narcotic substances. 71 It thus leaves it to the reader to conclude that investment implies 'receiving stolen property' or 'conversion'.
Here, however, hides the further problem of whether investing in property that has previously been expropriated can be seen as an internationally unlawful activity. The first objection might derive from the problematic private/criminal law analogy intended by the Act. An expropriation, even if unlawful under international standards, cannot be equated with 'stealing'. The taking of private property by public authorities, even if contrary to a State's own constitutional rules or to international obligations, is different from the unauthorized removal of such property by another private person. Most importantly, a State's confiscatory act will effect a transfer of title to the property involved. International practice generally recognizes that such takings are effective within the territory of the foreign expropriating country, even if they are unlawful.
72 Thus, property effectively vests in Cuba and it can effectively dispose of it now. That does not mean that it can rid itself of claims as to compensation, but 'de-recognition' would be against fundamental assumptions concerning a State's authority to regulate property ownership within its territory.
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VII. Critique of US Unilateralism
In addition to the specific critique valid against the Helms-Burton Act, there are a number of general considerations that caution against a unilateral approach in trying to enforce international law by domestic courts. First, unilateralism can be applied only by States that do not have to fear, or at least only to a minor and probably negligible extent, economic or other counter-measures. The lack of potential reciprocity in its application makes it a strong man's weapon only and thus, suspicious in a system based on sovereign equality of States in law coupled with extreme factual inequalities. Second, it might prove to be an overly costly method, similar to the unilateral trade embargo weapon that frequently ends up ineffective for the punish- Finally, on a more general level, this US attempt to 'de-recognize' property transfers effectuated abroad through its judicial system is likely to prove overly burdensome for the individuals involved and has the inherent danger of creating legal fictions deviating strongly from the real world. Certainly, it can be seen as being in line with past American attempts to fight internationally wrongful acts by their nonrecognition. 75 However, experience has shown that this is by and large a doubtful policy artificially differentiating between de jure and de facto situations, regimes, etc. It places a great burden on private parties if, for instance, it implies that certain acts lawful or effective in one country will not be recognized in another because this, in turn, might lead to multiple litigation, forum shopping etc. Assuming that the EU possesses a plausible argument for the Act's illegality both under traditional views on jurisdictional principles as well as under a 'reasonableness' test or comparatively flexible considerations on the jurisdictional reach of a State's legislation, the need arises to find an appropriate forum to adjudicate this genuine dispute.
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In the past -and in the absence of any specialized dispute settlement procedurejurisdictional quarrels have been usually handled by diplomatic means. Probably still the best known incidence was the pipeline embargo where -after strong diplo- In the present instance, the EU seems to follow a procedural double strategy, not relying exclusively on the diplomatic mode, but rather having recourse as well to the more institutionalized WTO dispute settlement mechanism. This in turn raises interesting questions about the feasibility of such a claim in the multilateral trade organization's realm. Granted that the WTO is no longer purely a trade organization, but rather a 'trade and ...' organization, it remains unclear whether the WTO is indeed the 'appropriate forum' for an international jurisdictional dispute of this kind.
Other than the sugar import restrictions of the Helms-Burton Act requiring a nonCuban origin certification which seem to violate GATT principles banning indirect import barriers, it is difficult to see how the extraterritoriality dispute concerning potential property claims could fall under the GATT regime in a technical sense. An interesting argument was advanced by the EU ambassador to the US and is likely to be raised by the EU in the current 'consultations' and -if it ever reaches this stagebefore a dispute settlement panel. 79 He expressed the view that a WTO dispute settlement panel might rule against the US because the 'reasonable trade expectations' of the aggrieved party, the EU, both with respect to the target country and the country imposing the boycott had been disappointed and that compensation was due. concerned, the EU seems to rely on the trade diminishing effect either as betweennational relations'. Read closely, the legitimate auto-determination of a contracting party under Article XXI(b)(iii) relates to the necessity of a contemplated action for the protection of its security interests, not to the existence of a certain situation triggering this right The present case might prove that the fact that a contracting party's nationals have been denied compensation for another State's expropriation of their property -despite all assertions to the contrary -can hardly be qualified as an 'emergency under international relations', in particular, if this incident dates back 36 years.
IX. Concluding Remarks
Given the serious uncertainties of pushing a claim against the extraterritorial reach of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act successfully before a WTO panel, recourse to WTO dispute settlement procedure appears all the more surprising and one wonders what might be the political reasons for such a step. One explanation could certainly lie in the current enthusiasm for international trade dispute settlement Whether it will suffice to persuade a panel of trade experts to look beyond pure trade issues remains to be seen.
